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Domestic and Trade Policy for Central and East European Agriculture 
Larry Karp and Spiro Stefanou 
Policy-makers with responsibility for Central and East European (CEE) agriculture 
face a basic choice between moving toward liberal markets, or toward the type of 
interventionist policies prevalent in the West.  There appears to  be a tendency to  adopt the 
second approach.  This is partly as  a result of habits of behaviour created under socialism, the 
example of the West, and the belief that liberal markets would lead to the destruction of 
domestic agriculture.  It would be unfortunate if policy-makers succumb to  this tendency. 
Instead of adopting sector-specific commodity programs, policy should be broadly neutral to 
agriCUlture.  In particular, this means avoiding commodity-specific tariffs or subsidies.  To the 
limited extent that government budget constraints admit support for the sector, this should be 
given by underwriting collateral for bank loans. 
Commodity programs provide producer support at excessive cost.  Collateral subsidies 
have less serious adverse effects, and some positive effects.  The "special considerations" 
invoked to support commodity programs are unconvincing. Commodity programs are bad 
policy because: they encourage unproductive lobbying which leads to  greater demands on the 
treasury;  a given level of state support creates unnecessary distortions; and the programs 
become capitalized into land values and are ineffective in supporting general prosperity in 
agriCUlture.  The benefits of a collateral subsidy are that it:  encourages the development of the 
banking sector, which in the long run assists agriculture; this subsidy has useful insurance 
properties; and it largely avoids the disadvantages of commodity programs.  Among the 
reasons which have been advanced to  support the use of commodity programs, and which we 
reject, are: the assertion that producers need assistance because they face monopsonistic 
processors; the West supports its agriCUlture, and CEE should follow suit in order to obtain a 
level playing field or to prepare for integration into the EC;  and there are adjustment costs 
and market failures that can be remedied by government intervention. 
Despite their severity, the problems within CEE agriculture are not qualitatively or 
quantitatively different than those in other sectors.  The general economic policies needed for 
all sectors include, privatization, demonopolisation, removal of subsidies, open trade, and 
restructuring or elimination of old debt.  The evidence that an  ad hoc and distortionary policy 
is being created and entrenched in CEE, makes it worth spelling out the importance to 
agriculture of an  alternative approach.  Most of our data and discussion of specific policies 
refer to  Hungary, Poland and (the former)  Czechoslovakia (EE-3). However, the principles 
underlying our recommendations apply more generally to  other CEE countries. 
Section I provides an overview of agricultural production and consumption in EE-3. 
Relative to West Europe, agriculture is an  important sector in the national economies, but its 
share in GDP and in the labour force was declining even before liberalization.  There exist a 11 
variety of fonns of farm ownership across CEE, and these are correlated with  size: private 
farms tend to be too small, and state and collective farms  too  large to  be run efficiently. 
Output per hectare is  low relative to West Europe, and varies widely across CEE.  The per 
capita production and consumption levels of major food items in  CEE approach and in some 
cases exceed Western levels.  Consumers' budget share for food is very high relative to 
Western levels. 
Section II discusses summary statistics of policies under socialism. We review 
evidence that distortions in OECD countries and in CEE under socialism were of similar 
orders of magnitude.  If this is correct, it implies that the adoption of a Western-style 
agricultural policy might resemble a lateral movement rather than progress toward 
liberalization.  In aggregate, it appears that consumers would be better off under free trade 
than under pre-liberalization policies with their explicit subsidies. 
Sections III and IV review arguments against commodity programs, and suggest that 
support be distributed by means of the banking sector.  CEE can not afford to protect its 
agricultural sector using Western-style policies.  Attempts to do  so are likely to result in 
wasted resources and a weaker agricultural sector. 
Sections V and VI assess the importance of agriculture in CEE trade, and review 
current trade policies. There has been a tendency for Western markets to become increasingly 
important for CEE agriCUltural trade. The composition of CEE agricultural exports is more 
similar in Eastern and Western markets than is the case for general commodity trade. These 
last two factors tend to diminish the (considerable) damage to CEE agriculture caused by the 
disruption of Eastern trading relations.  The Association Agreements with the EC and the 
recent Central European Free Trade Agreement show the extent to which agriculture is 
excluded from many of the benefits of liberal trade.  This exclusion is in response to 
pressures both internal and external to  CEE.  Within CEE there has been a move away from 
liberal trade policies for agriculture during the past year. 
The argument that domestic protection of CEE agriculture is a rational response to 
Western policies is criticized in Section VII.  The notion that adoption of Western-style 
policies is good preparation for integration into the EC seems to  be gaining popUlarity.  In 
our view this is a particularly serious mistake.  The argument for agriCUltural protection based 
on adjustment costs and market failures is discussed in Section VIII, and concluding 
comments are contained in Section IX. Introduction 
After two generations of state control, Central and East European (CEE) agriculture has 
been liberated to  face  world markets which are subject to  massive governmental interference. 
The socialist legacy in agriculture includes: fmancial crisis, inappropriate scale and 
technology, poorly defined property rights, and unfamiliarity with market transactions.  The 
liberalization process has added new difficulties by disrupting old intra- and international 
trading relations.  The problems in  agriCUlture,  and the policy environment needed to  improve 
them, are shared by other sectors. 
There is no doubt that government policy will continue to affect the agricultural sector. 
However, there is a debate as to whether this intervention should take the form of a system of 
taxes, subsidies, and quotas designed to  achieve specific policy objectives within the 
agricultural sector (e.g. certain levels of production, consumption, or trade). Throughout this 
paper we refer to  such a collection of programs as an agricultural policy. The distinguishing 
feature of an agricultural policy is that it is  sector-specific, and relies on individual programs 
which are commodity-specific. Most OECD nations have such agricultural policies.  The 
alternative to these is a broad-based (as opposed to  sector-specific) economic policy which 
attempts to promote reform and achieve growth. 
There is a strong temptation in CEE to adopt an agricultural policy.  This tendency stems 
from habits of behaviour created under socialism, the example of the West, and the belief that 
the alternative to an interventionist policy is laissez faire which would lead to  the destruction 
of domestic agriculture.  We think it would be unfortunate if policy-makers succumb to this 
temptation; instead, policy should be broadly neutral to agriculture.  In particular, this means 
avoiding commodity-specific tariffs or subsidies.  To the limited extent that government 
budget constraints admit support for the sector, this should be given by underwriting collateral 
for bank loans. 
There are three parts to our argument.  First, commodity programs are bad policy because: 
they encourage unproductive lobbying which leads to  greater demands on the treasury; a 
given level of state support creates unnecessary distortions; and the programs become 
capitalized into land values and are ineffective in supporting general prosperity in agriculture. 
Second, the benefits of a "collateral subsidy" are that it: encourages the development of the 
banking sector, which in the long run assists agriculture; this subsidy has useful insurance 
properties; and it largely avoids the disadvantages of commodity programs.  The third part to 
the argument consists of a rebuttal of many of the reasons that have been advanced to  support 
the use of commodity programs within CEE.  These include: the assertion that producers need 
assistance because they face monopsonistic processors; the West supports its agriCUlture, and 
CEE should follow suit in order to obtain a level playing field or to  prepare for integration 
into the EC; and there are adjustment costs and market failures that can be remedied by 
government intervention. 2 
Despite their severity, the problems within CEE agriculture are not qualitatively or 
quantitatively different than those in  other sectors.  The general economic policies needed for 
all  sectors include, privatization, demonopolisation, removal of subsidies, open trade, and 
restructuring or elimination of old debt.  CEE  governments should avoid creating a sector-
specific agricultural policy.  Economic policy should be  neutral toward agriculture, except for 
specific and limited goals which we describe below.  The evidence that an ad hoc  and 
distortionary policy is being created and entrenched in  CEE, makes it worth spelling out the 
importance to  agriculture of an  alternative approach. 
Most of our data and discussion of specific policies refer to Hungary, Poland and (the 
former)  Czechoslovakia (EE-3). However, the principles underlying our recommendations 
apply more generally to  other CEE countries.  Section I provides an  overview of agricultural 
production and consumption in EE-3.  Section II discusses summary statistics of policies 
under socialism.  Sections III and IV review arguments against commodity programs, and 
suggest an alternative.  Sections V and VI assess the importance of agriculture in CEE trade, 
and review current trade policies.  Section VII explains why Western agricultural policies do 
not rationalize the use of similar policies in CEE.  The argument for agricultural protection 
based on adjustment costs and market failures is discussed in Section VIII, and concluding 
comments are contained in Section IX. 
I. An Overview of Agricultural Production and Consumption  . 
In order to provide a context for the discussion of policy, this section presents an 
overview of agricultural production and consumption in CEE.  Relative to West Europe
2
, 
agriculture is an important sector in the national economies, but its share in GDP and in the 
labour force was declining even before liberalization.  There exist a variety of forms of farm 
ownership across CEE, and these are correlated with size: private farms tend to be too  small, 
and state and collective farms too large to  be run efficiently.  Output per hectare is low 
relative to West Europe, and varies widely across CEE.  The per capita production and 
consumption levels of major food items in CEE approach and in some cases exceed Western 
levels.  Consumers' budget share for food is very high relative to Western levels. 
There is considerable variation in the structure of ownership within CEE.  In 
Czechoslovakia and Hun.gary 96 and 85 percent of the land was owned by cooperatives and 
state farms, whereas in Poland 76 percent was privately owned before liberalization. State (or 
collective) farms  accounted for all land in the former Soviet Union (FSU);  state farms 
accounted for only 30,  15 and 21  percent of the land in  Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and 
2  Reference to West Europe is made only as a convenient basis for comparison.  We are 
not implying that West European agriculture represents a standard against which CEE 
agriculture should be measured. 3 
Poland, respectively. The average private farm in Poland, at less than 6 hectares, is unable to 
take advantage of economies of scale.  The state and collective farms  across CEE are 
generally regarded as too  large to be run efficiently. 
TABLE 1 
IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURE TO NATIONAL ECONOMY 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
(Agriculture as Percent of GOP) 
Bulgaria  12.9  15.0  12.2  11.7  11.2  10.8 
Czechoslovakia  7.5  7.5  7.1  6.9  7.1  6.8 
Hungary  18.6  19.0  17.7  15.1  15.0  14.3 
Poland  14.6  14.7  13.5  13.2  13.2  14.7 
(percent of Labor Force in Agricultural Production) 
Bulgaria  14.9  14.0  13.4  13.2  12.6  12.2 
Czechoslovakia  11.1  10.6  10.2  10.0  9.7  9.3 
Hungary  14.5  13.8  13.3  12.7  12.1  11.5 
Poland  24.4  23.7  22.9  22.2  21.5  20.8 
Source:  FAO Production Yearbook, Various Issues. 
There is evidence that the agricultural sector was declining even before liberalization. 
Agriculture accounted for over 14 percent of GDP in  Hungary and Poland in 1990, and 7 
percent in Czechoslovakia (fable 1).  Between 1985 and 1990 this share declined for 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.  In  1990 agricultural production employed 
over 20 percent of the labor force in Poland, and approximately 10 percent in Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland.
3  In 'the latter three countries this share declined since 1985.  By 
3  FAO statistics on agricultural employment tend to  be lower than data reported 
elsewhere.  National statistical services show Poland and Czechoslovakia's agricultural labor 
force as high as 28  and  15 percent, respectively.  However, many workers on agricultural 
cooperatives and state farms  are employed in services supporting the agricultural community 
(e.g., school teachers, social services) rather than production work. The re-classification of 
many positions from agricultural to non-agricultural employment in  1990 contributed to the 
dramatic decline in the Polish state agricultural workforce.  • 4 
contrast, in EC agriculture accounts for 6.5  percent of employment and between 2 - 4 percent 
of GDP in  1990 (FAO,  1992; World Bank 1992).  This comparison is consistent with a 
general tendency for the importance of agriculture to decrease as  national income grows. 
Output per hectare varies across CEE but is generally much lower than EC levels. 
Hungarian productivity, the highest in CEE, is at 87  percent of the West German level for 
potatoes, 90 percent for grains, and 95 percent for mille  Grain yields in  Poland and Ukraine 
are approximately half the German levels; yields in Czechoslovakia reach 80 percent of the 
German levels.  Potato yields range from Bulgaria's 32 percent to  the Hungarian level. 
The quantity, if not the quality of food consumption in CEE, was close to  that of much 
richer economies, but consumers spent a large proportion of their income on food.  Meat 
consumption at the time of the transition in  CEE rivaled or exceeded the Western European 
levels. Following liberalization, the consumer budget shares for food increased from under 40 
percent to over 50 percent in Czechoslovakia and Poland;  in  contrast, the budget share for 
food in Eastern Gennany dropped by nearly  10 percent in the fIrst year of price liberalization. 
In Western Europe, the consumers' budget share for food is approximately 20 percent 
(Hallberg, 1992). 
II.  Agricultural Policies Under Socialism 
Pre-refonn agricultural policies are of more than historical interest  Measures of subsidies 
under socialism suggest the magnitude of the policy shift implied by adoption of a liberal 
regime.  This has direct bearing on the central policy debate.  Proponents of an agricultural 
policy (as we have defIned the term) believe that liberal policies would devastate the sector. 
In their view, commodity programs represent a compromise between excessive intervention 
under socialism and neglect under the free market.  However, there is evidence that 
distortions in OECD countries and in CEE under socialism were of similar orders of 
magnitude.  If  this is correct, it implies that the adoption of a Western-style agricultural 
policy might resemble a lateral movement rather than progress. 
Despite a number of shortcomings
4
,  the most useful summary statistics of producer and 
consumer subsidies/taxes are the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) and the Consumer 
Subsidy Equivalent (CSE).  These aggregate all types of intervention into a single measure. 
For example, a wheat PSE of 30 (percent) means that aggregate government transfers to 
wheat producers increase revenue from wheat sales by 30%.  Table 2 presents the PSEs for 
CEE and the EC and US  for comparison.  Aggregate PSE and CSE measures are weighted 
averages, with weights being the share of value of the commodities.  There are three import 
characteristics of PSE and CSE data for CEE and OECD. 
4  The main problems with these statistics are discussed in Karp and Stefanou (1993b) 5 
TABLE 2 
PRODUCER SUBSIDY EQUIVALENTS, 1989 
Beef  Oil- Sugar 
Barley  &  Com  Eggs  Milk  Poultry  Pork  seed'  Beet  Wheat  Ag-
Veal  gregate 
Czecho- -30  77  -3  22  5  n.a.  38  -45  -9  -22  20 
slovakia 
Hungary  -18  53  -26  1  25  10  -3  -75  -25  -14  -3 
Poland  51  3  n.a.  65  -7  31  4  -1  -21  42  2 
USSR  n.a.  32  56  n.a.  1  46  20  -16  55  -31  21 
EC  34  55  40  16  59  26  6  60  49  27  41 
US  - 32  30  8  55  10  7  9  43  25  28 
Sources:  Europe Branch, ATAD/ERS, U. S.  Department of Agriculture.  OECD, Tables of Producer Subsidy 
Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents, 1979-1990, Paris 1991; Liefert et al., Table 1; USSR 
PSE levels are for 1986. 
n.a. =  not available 
•  Rapeseed is reported for Oilseed for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. 
First, the aggregate producer subsidies in CEE were no higher than those in the West; for 
many commodities CEE producers received low subsidies.  By this measure at least, 
agricultural policies in the West were as  distortio~ary as those in CEE. This data indicates 
that aggregate support for agricultural producers in CEE and the USSR was lower than in the 
EC and US.  The aggregate statistics disguise considerable cross-commodity variation.  At the 
aggregate level, Hungarian agricultural producers were taxed in 1989, but support to 
Hungarian beef and veal production is as high and higher than the EC and US, respectively. 
Sugar and rapeseed production were taxed in CEE as was Czechoslovakian and Hungarian 
grain production.  (Hungary currently subsidizes grain exports.)  In contrast, the EC and US 
taxed none of the agricultural products identified in Table 2.  The taxation of Polish 
producers began recently.  Between 1983-1988, milk was the only commodity that was taxed. 
The taxation of Czechoslovakian and Hungarian producers in  1989 follows the pattern for the 
1980s, when grain and rapeseed producers were taxed and meat producers were subsidized. 
Second, data (not shown here) indicates that income support policies dominated price 
supports in CEE until the late  1980s.  Income policies tend to be less distortionary than price 
policies, since the former have a smaller effect on production decisions.  Western nations rely 
more heavily on price policies, and are attempting to replace these by income policies. 6 
Occasionally in Czechoslovakia (1985-86,  1988) and Hungary (1985) price policies taxed 
producers, but these were overwhelmed by the subsidizing effect of income support programs. 
The income support component was always positive and, for Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
exceeded the effect of price policies during most of 1983-91.  Polish income support matched 
or exceeded price supports in the aggregate between  1985-87 and 1989.  From 1988-1991 
price interventions taxed producers.  The level of support from income subsidies decreased, so 
that the net effect was a producer tax.  Data for the USSR in  1986 suggests that income 
support programs in  that country provided slightly more than half of a PSE of 21  percent 
(Liefert et al.). 
Third, data on CSEs imply that despite large nominal subsidies, on  balance consumers 
were implicitly taxed in 1989 by the inability to trade at world prices (Table 3). Hungary had 
the lowest aggregate tax (1  percent) and Poland the largest (35  percent).  All three CEE 
countries taxed consumption of beef, butter and vegetable oil and subsidized consumption of 
pOUltry.  The FSU (in  1986) taxed only the consumption of pOUltry and subsidized 
consumption of the other selected food products and food consumption in aggregate.  In 
aggregate, Polish consumers were taxed at the same level as EC consumers, while 
Czechoslovak consumers were taxed at the level of U.S. consumers.  The use of an 
overvalued exchange rate in calculating CSEs would exaggerate the extent of the consumer 
tax (understate the subsidy), whereas failing to account for the fact that demand was 
constrained by quotas underestimates the extent of the tax. 
TABLE 3 
CONSUMER SUBSIDY EQUIVALENTS, 1989 
Beef 
Wheat  Pork  &  Chicken  Milk  Butter  Veg.  Aggreg 
Veal  Oil  ate 
Czechoslovakia  3  -36  -15  5  79  -37  -59  -16 
Hungary  -9  -14  -2  0  -22  -15  -36  -1 
Poland  -9  35  -45  2  -54  n.a.  -49  -35 
USSR (1986)  66  2  82  -28  29  58  110  32 
EC  -18  -12  -49  -29  -49  0  0  -34 
US  -1  1  -25  0  -45  0  0  -16 
Source:  Europe Branch, Agricultural Trade Analysis Division, ERS, USDA. 7 
The CSE data may appear to contradict the conventional view that food consumption was 
subsidized and that the removal of these subsidies would lead to falling consumption.  This 
view is based on the fact that consumption subsidies were a significant part of government 
budgets prior to the reform.  However, these subsidies reflect the difference between 
consumer prices and production costs, whereas the CSEs involve a comparison between 
domestic consumer prices and world prices.  Therefore the  CSE data is consistent with large 
budgetary outlays for consumption subsidies.  The CSE data implies that the removal of 
consumer subsidies and the ability to trade at world prices would be likely to  benefit 
consumers. 
This data suggests that a transition from socialist policies to liberal policies in CEE, and 
the removal of illiberal agricultural policies in the West, would represent changes of similar 
orders of magnitude.  As with any summary statistic, the PSEs and CSEs miss a host of 
subtleties, so it is dangerous to draw broad conclusions from them.  In particular, government 
intervention in agriculture was far more pervasive in CEE than in the West, and this might 
appear to  suggest that liberalization would require a much greater change in the former 
region.  This is a plausible interpretation.  On the other hand, the complicated nature of 
socialist intervention meant that much of it was probably contradictory and self-canceling, and 
much of it led to pure waste (rather than simply inefficient transfers). 
There is an emerging consensus in the West that commodity programs should be phased 
out and replaced by less distortionary ways of supporting the agricultural sector.  At the same 
time there is support in some circles for introducing an agricultural policy based on 
commodity programs into CEE.  If  that advice were followed, and CEE policy came to 
resemble current policy in the West, then the evidence we have presented above suggests that 
CEE would have failed to achieve substantial liberalization.  The current state of flux in CEE 
probably does not make reform less painful, but it makes reform more possible.  It would be 
a wasted opportunity if CEE imitates the failures of Western policy.  Following sections 
discuss the disadvantages of such policy, and suggest an  alternative. 
III. General Arguments for Policy Neutrality 
There are political and economic arguments in favour of policy neutrality.  The political 
arguments are based on the belief that sector-specific policies encourage lobbying which leads 
to  a higher level of intervention.  The economic arguments are that sector-specific policies 
tend to be ad hoc, inflexible, and involve unnecessary distortions. 
Producers are encouraged to lobby for tariffs, subsidies, or other measures which affect 
individual commodities, if the political climate tolerates these policies.  The incentives to 
attempt to increase protection of a single commodity are much reduced when this requires an 
increase in the general level of protection.  This requirement makes the free-rider problem 
more severe.  Individual producers still benefit from protection whether or not they contribute 
to  the lobbying effort, but withholding their contribution is less likely to  affect the success of 8 
the effort.  In addition, the interests arrayed against a general increase in protection are  likely 
to  be more powerful than those that oppose the protection of a single commodity.  For both 
of these reasons, a policy environment that treats different sectors neutrally is  likely to 
generate less political pressure for distortions. 
The adoption of sector-specific policies spawns a group of officials who are interested in 
their perpetuation.  Since old policies seldom die but are simply buried under new policies, 
regulations become ever more complex; the undesirable consequences of old policies create 
arguments for the adoption of new ones.  Understanding these well enough to execute them 
requires specialized knowledge.  The value of this human capital would be wiped out if 
transparent policies were adopted.  There is a natural allegiance between producers in a sector 
and the public servants who oversee sectoral policies, and their interests are not always 
compatible with those of the general public. 
The political basis for the objection to  sectoral policies is that their adoption increases the 
general level of protection, and does so  using complex and arbitrary schemes.  However, 
commitment to uniform policies has the obvious cost of decreasing flexibility.  It is necessary 
to decide how important this flexibility is likely to  be for  CEE agriculture. 
If  the major distortions in an economy are policy-induced (e.g., caused by tariffs or 
subsidies), there is a presumption that harmonization, which represents the movement away 
from sectoral policies, improves efficiency. If all policies are tariffs and goods are net 
substitutes in production and consumption, then greater uniformity of tariff levels increases 
welfare.  A movement toward a more uniform tariff structure is not necessarily welfare 
improving if some goods are not net substitutes or if policies other than tariffs (e.g. 
commodity-specific subsidies) are used.  However, in such cases there are no general results 
for the design of welfare improving policy reform.  Certainly there is no presumption that 
lack of uniformity is beneficial.  Therefore, the simple case where the important distortions 
are policy-induced provides no support for the adoption of sectoral policies.  We have to  turn 
to other types of distortions to look for such support. 
CEE agriculture under socialism was explicitly subsidized, but the agricultural sector was 
disadvantaged in many important ways:  it confronted monopolized and inefficient processors-
distributors; it received low quality inputs; and producers had little training in how to make 
decisions in a market environment. The explicit subsidies could be, and in many cases were, 
eliminated with the  strok~ of a pen.  With flexible prices, the terms of trade turned against 
agriculture rapidly. For example, a ratio of indices of (output) prices received by Polish 
farmers and (input) prices paid by them fell from  118 in  1988 to  50 in  1990, and then rose to 
75 in  1991  (Agra Europe, February 1993). 
It is widely reported that liberalization also left producers more vulnerable to 
monopsonistic processors, who were no  longer constrained by the state to  fixed wholesale 
price mark-ups and profitability levels.  There is  some statistical evidence for this view.  In 
the first half of 1991, following liberalization in January, profits in  the Czechoslovak food 9 
processing sector increased by 245 percent over the previous year.  During the same period 
agricultural producers experienced losses (Slovak Ministry of Agriculture and Nutrition, 
1992).  A year after the January 1990 liberalization in  Poland, the ratio of retaiVprocurement 
price had actually fallen for most commodities; however, by the end of 1991  they exceeded 
the  1990 levels.  This suggests that retailers increased their markup, although not 
immediately. Table 4, reproduced from Kwiecinski (1992), compares Polish and West German 
retaiVprocurement price ratios.  For most commodities, the markups in Poland were 
significantly higher than in Germany.  This, together with the presumption that there is less 
value added in the Polish processing sector, is additional evidence of monopsony power. 
TABLE 4 
RET  All.../PROCUREMENT PRICE RATIOS FOR SELECTED FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN POLAND AND WEST GERMANY  (in percent) 
January-March 1990  January-March 1991  June-August 1991 
Retail Product! 
Primary Product  Poland  W. Germany  Poland  West  Poland  West 
Germany  Germany 
Cooked  573  928  566  971  746  927 
Hams/Pigs 
Beef/Cattle  306  344  298  454  335  428 
Milk/Milk  217  206  212  217  257  225 
Butter/Milk  1786  1391  2139  1389  1760  1428 
Wheat  401  341  395  347  437  341 
Flour/Wheat 
Source:  Kwiecinski, 1992, Table 2. 
Processors' market power and other features which place the production sector at a 
disadvantage could not be altered by government fiat.  Activities which may be viable in the 
long run, as these problems are corrected, are not profitable in the short-run.  This provides a 
rationale, similar to the infant industry argument, for short term protection of the sector.  Of 
course, the same types of problems plague other sectors of the economy in which the state 
played a leading role, so it is not clear that agriculture has a greater claim on public 
resources.  Demonopolisation is certainly an  important objective, in the agricultural processing 
sector as elsewhere.  Producer price support policies are more likely to retard than to  advance 
this goal, since state support for a sector which is exploited by downstream monopsonists 
may be largely captured by the monopsonist. 10 
Proponents of adjustment assistance may believe that liberalization has led to  a 
widespread and excessive exodus of resources, or that the process encourages the wrong 
people to  leave the sector. In a later subsection we discuss the policy prescription for the first 
case where the exodus is unselective. Here we consider the second situation, which may be 
appear to describe Poland. There a large number of small, private, subsistence farms co-
existed with large state farms which purchased inputs and relied on off-farm sales.  By virtue 
of their lower degree of self-sufficiency, the state farms are more vulnerable to market 
reforms which cause a deterioration of their terms of trade.  These are also the farms that are 
more likely to  adopt modern technology and an  appropriate scale of production.  It appears 
that the individuals and organizations that should be encouraged to remain in the sector are 
the most likely to be driven from it. 
Even if this conjecture is correct, a policy that affects all producers in a sub-sector (such 
as  a producer subsidy for milk) is the wrong response.  Such a policy is likely to  be too 
expensive, either in terms of government revenue or cost to consumers, to undertake on a 
scale large enough to keep the most vulnerable (and by assumption those with the most 
potential) in the sector.  The primary effect of a more modest subsidy is to entrench the 
position of the small and inefficient producers.  Also, it may be socially desirable for the 
most efficient farmers to leave the sector.  The opportunity cost of the small proprietors 
remaining in agriculture is probably very low.  They may have a comparative advantage in 
agriculture, relative to the more efficient producers even though the latter have an absolute 
advantage.  Finally, it is not clear that the conjectured response of producers is actually 
occurring.  In general, there has not been the sharp drop in production that would be 
associated with a departure of the most efficient producers.  For a particular example, the 
changing size distribution of Polish dairy and pork producers appears to involve a decrease in 
the shares of both the largest and smallest units (Karp and Stefanou,  1993a). 
IV. Agricultural Banking Instead of Commodity Programs 
The view that recent reform puts at greatest risk the most efficient units in agricultural 
underscores the need for modernization of the banking sector.  In common with enterprises 
throughout the economy, state fanns in CEE inherited debt which bears little relation to  their 
economic potential.  This debt reflects a sunk cost;  the cost of servicing the debt should not 
enter calculations of the economic viability of an enterprise.  The uncertainty of whether, or 
to  what extent, the debt will be forgiven, also makes enterprises less attractive to buyers and 
hinders the process of privatization.  The resolution of this issue, which in many cases will 
require banks to  write off debt, will  weaken banks and lead to  heavy demands on  the state 
treasury.  These needs should have priority over price support measures. 
In Western countries agriculture relies more heavily on debt than equity financing, 
possibly because moral hazard and adverse selection problems tend to be severe in that sector. 
This suggests that agriculture is among the sectors more seriously disadvantaged by the 11 
embryonic stage of the CEE banking sector.  Refonns needed to develop banking are 
occurring.  An example of this is the refonn of Polish collateral law (IRIS  Update 1992). 
Under previous law, inventory which in the nonnal course of events was sold, could not be 
used for collateral.  The refonn makes it possible to  use stocks as collateral, and also clarifies 
and strengthens the creditor's right to  seize collateral in the event of non-payment. Refonns 
of this sort are a prerequisite of an efficient credit market. 
Where state resources are available to  support the agricultural sector, these should be 
distributed through banks rather than direct price subsidies.  In the  1993 Polish agricultural 
budget, however, the amount allocated to  "servicing agricultural credits" is approximately 
equal to the amount spent of fuel  subsidies, about a quarter of the total budget (Agra Europe, 
1993). 
Price supports reduce credit risks, but they are an indirect and expensive means of 
promoting agricultural banking.  Subsidizing. producers via the banking sector fosters an 
institution that is  necessary to the long run health of agriculture.  This fonn of subsidy does 
not distort the relative costs of purchased inputs and consequently leads to more efficient 
production. It also makes it more likely that state aid will reach efficient producers, since the 
banks care about the probability of repayment of loans.  Where producers are heterogenous, 
with some largely self-sufficient and others reliant on market transactions (e.g. Poland), the 
latter group will be better placed to  apply for loans.  In  1991  State farms in Poland had more 
than twice the amount of bank debt of private farms. 
Agricultural support that is offered in the fonn of a credit subsidy should be for financing 
operating costs or new investment, rather than for the purchase of land.  We return to  this 
point below.  The question remains whether such aid should come in the fonn of an interest 
rate subsidy or a collateral subsidy (by which we mean that a government guarantee provides 
a partial substitute for a borrower's collateral).  Either fonn of intervention affects both the 
equilibrium interest rate and collateral requirement that farmers face, since these are jointly 
determined.  In special cases, the two policy instruments are equivalent, but in general the 
effects of the policies will differ. 
It seems likely that an interest rate subsidy, for example, would have a greater effect on 
the equilibrium interest rate than would a collateral subsidy which carries the same expected 
cost to the government treasury.  If  this assumption is accepted, it provides a basis for 
comparing the two types of policies. The interest rate subsidy is more common; it has been 
widely used in developing countries.  However, for several reasons we think that a collateral 
subsidy is the better option.  The difficulty of obtaining any credit seems a more acute 
problem than the high cost of credit, and a collateral subsidy provides a more direct way to 
deal with this.  For efficiency reasons producers should pay (approximately) the social cost of 
capital at least in  some states of nature.  However, in view of the absence of private insurance 
markets, it may be desirable to insure them through social policy in bad states of nature (a 
fall in prices or poor harvest). These two considerations imply that the interest rate fanners 
face should be close to the competitive rate, but that credit should be possible to  obtain and 12 
default should not lead to ruin.  This suggests using collateral subsidies, which provide a 
substitute for insurance.  In  addition, it is easier to  design incentives for banks to  make 
appropriate loans when collateral subsidies rather than interest rate subsidies are used.
5 
Collateral subsidies have important similarities with, but are superior to, a more common 
method of providing insurance: government supported price floors.  That policy offers 
insurance against price but not output risk, and thus provides limited protection against 
income risk.  Also, minimum price programs are commodity-specific; collateral subsidies, on 
the other hand, provide implicit insurance for whatever activity (crop or livestock) the farmer 
undertakes, and therefore have less tendency to distort the choice of activity.  Minimum price 
programs often cover all producers and do not set limits on quantity.  This lack of selectivitY 
makes the programs a very expensive way to provide insurance. 
Some policies used in  the West share features price support and loan subsidy prgrams. 
The US  loan rate program allows producers to pledge a certain quantity of their harvest as 
collateral for a loan.  The producer is forgiven the loan and forfeits his collateral if its value 
at harvest is less than the loan.  "Set aside" requirements (obligations to idle a certain amount 
of land) limit the quantity that can be borrowed in  this manner.  By fixing the loan rate, the 
government sets a price floor,  and by choosing the set aside requirement the government 
affects the quantity that is protected by  the floor.  If  the loan rate is higher than the expected 
price, the government effectively values the collateral more highly than the market, and the 
program resembles a collateral subsidy.  However, there are the important differences already 
mentioned.  As a minimum price policy, the loan rate program provides price rather than 
income insurance, it is crop specific and therefore distorts the choice of activities, and it does 
not discriminate across individuals on the basis of efficiency. 
In addition, there are political and institutional reasons for thinking that collateral 
subsidies are preferable to price floors.  The latter require direct and obvious government 
involvement.  Collateral subsidies use banks to mediate government intervention.  In the 
process of supporting agriculture, collateral subsidies also promote the growth of banking, a 
sector that is crucial to agriCUlture.  The absence of direct government  -producer interaction, 
and the lack of identification with specific commodities, means that collateral subsidies 
should have a smaller tendency to generate powerful interest groups.  A phased reduction of 
the total subsidy to  agricultural banks may be simpler to  achieve than the piecemeal reform of 
many commodity-specific policies. 
One of the drawbacks of agricultural programs is that they become capitalized in land 
values.  The expectation that current support programs will continue, increases the price of 
5  Mexico provides a prominent example where collateral subsidies were used, and with 
unfortunate results.  The failure resulted from the poor design of the program, in which the 
government collateral completely replaced private collateral, and the banks had no incentive 
to collect loan payments. 13 
agricultural assets, chiefly land.  This increase in wealth of current landowners is realized 
when the land is sold.  The additional fann revenue resulting from the agricultural programs 
is paid to the new owner, but this largely compensates for the higher operating costs due to 
the higher debt needed to pay for the more expensive land.  The programs are not an efficient 
way to increase net income.  The agricultural program which is intended to bolster fann 
income is transformed into a windfall for the original owner.  Subsequent owners have (to 
some extent) already paid for the continuation of the programs, although they have not, of 
course, paid those who bear the cost of the programs: the taxpayer and consumer.  This 
implicit "prepayment" makes fanners feel justified in demanding the continuation of the 
programs; banks, who hold the debt, support them.  The government can abandon a policy 
that is largely unsuccessful in raising net fann income, and risk a financial crisis.  It can 
continue or increase the level of support, allowing current owners to remain solvent or receive 
capital gains, but exacerbating the problem for the next generation of fanners and policy-
makers. Finally, it can buy off current owners by exchanging lump sum transfers for price 
policies. 
The problem of capitalization of benefits plagues fann programs in the EC, the US, and 
Japan.  CEE has the opportunity to avoid this outcome by rejecting the type of agricultural 
policy found in those countries.  Now is  the right time to adopt this approach, since reform 
will probably be more difficult in the future.  A critical stage of CEE agricultural 
transformation is privatization, which is complicated by the uncertain policy environment. 
Land markets are thin, and there is great uncertainty about the value of land.  In Poland, for 
example, the real price of land of former state fanns fell  by nearly 50 per cent in 1992, and 
less than  10 per cent of the amount put on the market was sold (Agra Europe 1993). It is 
important that land prices reflect individuals' expectations about the productivity of land, and 
the value of output in world markets.  Land prices should not reflect producer optimism about 
government support.  Given the state of world agricultural markets, this means that land 
prices would be low in comparison to  similar land in the West. 
Low land values are unattractive to  those with claims on  the land:  the state, workers and 
managers in agricultural enterprises who are eligible to  obtains shares at a discount, and those 
with restitution claims.  The latter two  groups of claimants have no basis for expecting the 
state to increase the value of their assets. Increased state revenue from land sales in which 
prices are inflated by the expectation of future government largesse, merely represents an 
extremely inefficient way of public borrowing. 
The willingness to let land prices settle at a low level raises two policy problems.  The 
first, already alluded to, is that it weakens the balance books of banks which hold these assets 
as collateral.  However, this is part of the general reorganization required of banks, a process 
which will involve writing-off much old debt.  If collateral subsidies were offered for debt 
used to acquire land, this would be a means of subsidizing land prices, and therefore would 
provide a transfer to current owners.  Since scarce public revenue should not be devoted to 
this goal, we recommended that credit subsidies be for short and medium term debt, i.e.  to 
cover operating costs and new investment rather than the purchase of land. 14 
The second policy problem is that low land prices increase the attraction of speCUlative 
purchases for Western buyers.  Although the economic argument for blocking foreign 
purchases is ambiguous, political considerations may be paramount here.  The amount of 
foreign revenue that could be generated from land sales is probably small, but the political 
cost of appearing to sell the nation's birthright for a pittance would be substantial.  Moreover, 
if such purchases are mainly for speculative reasons, there is a greater chance that the land 
would be left idle.  In this case, the sales would decrease agricultural employment and 
investment.  The same considerations do not apply to industrial assets, which include the 
agricultural processing and distribution industries.  Possibilities for speCUlative gains also 
exists with industrial assets, but because of their rapid depreciation when unused, such 
purchases are made with the intention of additional investment and continued operation. 
Investors do not buy factories with the intention of closing them down for ten years until the 
market improves.  Therefore, restrictions on foreign land purchases are sensible. 
To summarize, our main point is that CEE should avoid an  agricultural policy that relies 
on a web of subsidies and quantity restrictions.  In so far as government budget constraints 
are consistent with aid to agriculture, it should be given through the banking sector. This 
method of transfer avoids some of the greatest drawbacks of agricultural policy, preserves 
many of the useful effects of such policy, and promotes the growth of a sector vital to 
agriculture.  In situations where interest rate and collateral subsidies are not equivalent, we 
have explained why collateral subsidies appear preferable.  Such subsidies should be 
concentrated on short and medium term debt, so that they have the characteristic of income 
support programs and investment subsidies, rather than long term debt, where they would 
support land prices.  There is, of course, the danger that the expectation of such subsidies in 
the future would be capitalized into land prices. However, this form of government support is 
mediated by a neutral institution whose interest is served by efficient allocation of the aid.  It 
is not tied to specific commodities, so it discourages the formation of producer groups; and it 
would be available only after satisfaction of standard criteria for loans, rather than as a matter 
of right.  These features give the program the character of a temporary measure.  They 
enhance flexibility, making it easier to change the amount of aid or the criteria for receiving 
it.  Consequently there is a smaller likelihood of the program having the perverse effects 
which have resulted from agricultural policy in many Western countries. 
There are two practical objections to  using banks rather than commodity programs to 
support CEE agriculture.  The first is  the logistical problem stemming from the early stage of 
development of CEE banking.  If  the government's objective was to transfer a large amount 
of resources to the agricultural sector,  a weak banking sector would be a bottleneck.  The 
clumsier but quicker method of price support policies and subsidies might be defensible. 
However,  CEE governments are not in a position to make large transfers to  agriculture. 
Since the transfers will necessarily be small, they must be made carefully and with a view to 
the long term. Also, the logistical problems can be overstated.  Initially, the loan application 
can be made very rudimentary without completely eliminating its role as a screening device. 
Any form of government intervention requires administrative costs, which might as well take 
the form of training future bankers rather than government officials. 15 
The second objection is that providing support via banks appears to  increase opportunities 
for corruption.  This view stems from the fact that under commodity programs, government 
support is conditioned on variables that can be relatively easily observed (output or inputs). 
A loan contract personalizes the transfer, which raises the possibility that bankers will be able 
to extract bribes from borrowers.  If this happened the program would be an inefficient way 
to support producers.  However, this comparison may understate the potential for corruption 
under commodity programs, and overstate the potential with credit programs.  There have 
been reports of corruption under CAP programs, e.g., involving the production of substandard 
wine for intervention stocks.  Discouraging corruption requires a strong administrative 
structure under either commodity of credit programs.  With many banks offering services 
under similar circumstances it is possible to use "yardstick competition" to monitor bankers. 
The performance of various banks can be compared, making it easier to detect corruption.  A 
low ratio of program loans to program costs for a particular bank signals that the bank has 
either used poor judgement or been corrupt in allocating the subsidies. 
This problem of asymmetric information between bankers and the. government is an 
additional reason for preferring collateral subsidies to interest rate subsidies.  Under the latter, 
there is a fixed relation between the total government cost of the subsidy and the amount of 
money lent, making it impossible to determine whether deserving applicants received the 
loans.  With a collateral subsidy, on  the other hand, the government incurs a cost only when 
the loan is not repaid.  This makes the relation between the amount of government money 
paid to a particular bank, and the amount of loans made by that bank under the program, a 
random variable.  The bank is able to improve the ratio of program loans to  government costs 
by choosing good applicants.  By conditioning the banker's reward on this ratio, the 
government is able to decrease the banker's temptation to behave corruptly. 
v. Agriculture and Trade 
As a background for discussing the role of current trade policy, we provide an overview 
of CEE agricultural trade during the 1980s.  This trade is important, but to varying degrees 
for CEE countries.  There has been a tendency for Western markets to become increasingly 
important for CEE agricultural trade. The composition of CEE agricultural exports is more 
similar in Eastern and Western markets than is  the case for general commodity trade. These 
last two factors tend to diminish the (considerable) damage to  CEE agriculture caused by the 
disruption of Eastern trading relations. 
Agricultural exports as a percentage of total CEE exports increased in 1990 over the 1987-
89 level while the share of imports decreased (Table 5).  Within CEE and FSU, agriculture as 
a share of total exports are largest for Hungary, and smallest for FSU and Czechoslovakia. 
Agriculture as a share of total imports are largest for FSU;  they are also important for 
Czechoslovakia and Poland, but much smaller for Bulgaria and Hungary. 16 
TABLE 5 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE AS  PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 
1987-1989  1990 
IMPORTS 
Bulgaria  7.1  6.9 
Hungary  8.8  8.5 
Poland  14.3  13.2 
Czechoslovakia  14.3  12.0 
USSR  17.3  16.2 
EXPORTS 
Bulgaria  10.5  12.1 
Hungary  21.3  24.3 
Poland  10.0  14.6 
Czechoslovakia  4.9  6.2 
USSR  2.7  2.3 
Source:  UN, ECE. Agricultural Review for Europe No. 34. Vol. I. 1992. 
The economic liberalization in CEE coincided with the dissolution of the eastern-bloc 
trading area, CMEA, leading to the interruption of the traditional trading relationships within 
CEE and between CEE and FSU.  This reinforced a tendency, which had already been 
apparent, of increased importance of Western agricultural trade.  Barter exchanges between 
CEE and FSU republics have been widely reported but are difficult to quantify.  Combined 
CEE and FSU agricultural exports to Western Europe exceeded imports in 1990 (Table 6). 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia ran trade surpluses, while the FSU, Romania 
and Albania ran deficits with the EC and other European nations. 
With  17 percent of total FSU imports consisting of agricultural products during the 80'  s, 
the FSU was a major market for CEE products.  CEE had large market shares of FSU imports 
of eggs, vegetables, and fruit.  It had a small market share for cereal, the single most 
important agricultural import for FSU (25 percent of their total).  FSU grain imports increased 
at an  annual rate of 3.7 percent between 1986-90, but grain imports from North America 
increased at an  annual rate of 9 percent, and in  1988 - 90 accounted for two-thirds of the 
market. France, the major EC grain exporter, supplied 10 percent of the FSU grain imports by 
the late 1980s.  Hungary, the dominant CEE exporter, lost market share over the decade, and 
had less than 3 percent of the FSU market by 1990. 17 
TABLE 6 
BALANCE OF TRADE OF WESTERN EUROPE 
FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE COUNTRIES IN 1990 
(millions of 1990 SUS) 
Albania  Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland  Romania  CS  USSR  Total 
EC  -20  76  808  692  -311  33  -946  332 
EFTA  12  72  188  -21  -4  8  -140  115 
Others  -19  8  249  211  -30  25  -179  265 
Total  -27  156  1245  882  -345  66  -1265  712 
Source:  UN,ECE, AgriculturaI Review for Europe, No. 34, Vol II. 
(A positive entry indicates that the country at the top of the table had a surplus with the region on the left of the 
table.) 
Hungary has maintained a positive agricultural trade balance with CEE, Western Europe, 
and in aggregate. The FSU and Western Europe account for 30 and 50 percent of Hungarian 
agricultural exports, respectively, in  1989-90.  In the mid-1980s Hungarian agricultural 
exports to CEE and FSU exceeded exports to Western Europe, but this was reversed by 1987. 
The increased importance of the West relative to  the East is due to increasing meat and dairy 
exports to Western Europe and decreasing cereal exports to  CEE and FSU. 
Poland's agricultural trade balance fluctuated over 1985-90, but except for 1990, remained 
small (in comparison, say, to Hungary's balance). Poland maintained a positive balance with 
both Western Europe and the East over 1987-90.  Over the last two years of the decade, 
exports to Western Europe were more than ten times as large as exports to  the USSR. 
Czechoslovakia was a net agricultural importer from formerly planned economies between 
1980-90 but became a net exporter in  1991.  Agricultural exports to formerly planned 
economies accounted for over 30 percent of all agricultural exports from 1980-88. 
Agricultural imports from these economies accounted for approximately 65 percent of all 
agricultural imports in the mid-1980s but dropped by more than half during 1989-91. 
The composition of exports between the CEE's trading partners in the formerly planned 
and market economies can be summarized by an  "index of similarity".  The index is defined 
as  1  - lJ (o~ - O~)2 where  o~ and  o~ denote the shares of commodity i in  total 
ii'  I  I 
(agricultural) exports to the East (formerly planned economies) and West (all market-oriented 
economies), respectively.  The index ranges from 0 to  1, with a value of 1 indicating that the 
composition of exports is  the same for both regions, and a value of 0 indicating that exports 
are completely dissimilar. 18 
Rodrik (1992a) calculates this index for total exports (including agriculture). He interprets 
an increase in the index as a positive sign of adjustment, since it implies that markets are 
being found in the West for commodities which can no longer be sold in the East.  However, 
there is no reason to  suppose that in the long run the composition of exports will or should be 
the same for the two regions.  An increase in the index may simply mean that following the 
loss of markets in the East, CEE economies are failing to  make the changes necessary to  take 
advantage of trade with the West.  Although the interpretation of a change in the index is 
ambiguous, its level is still interesting.  Other things being equal, a larger value implies that 
the loss of markets in  one region should cause fewer adjustment problems, since similar 
products are being sold in other markets. 
Table 7 reproduces Rodrik's indices for total exports and presents indices for agricultural 
exports.  The most striking result is that for Czechoslovakia and Hungary, there is  greater 
similarity between the composition of agricultural exports to  the East and West, than is the 
case for exports in general. (We were unable to construct the index for Poland.)  This 
suggests that there is no reason to  single out agriculture as one of the. sectors which has been 
most severely hurt by the disintegration of FSU and the resulting loss of markets. Of course, 
there are other factors which point to  a different conclusion.  The most important of these is 
that in Western markets there are more import restrictions for agriculture than for 
manufacturing in general. 
TABLE 7 
CHANGING COMPOSmON OF EXPORTS IN CEE 
1980  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Agricultural Exports 
Czechoslovakia  .988  .962  -- .981  .991  .910  .966  .981 
Hungary  -- .799  .880  .926  .879  .803  .898 
Total Exports 
Czechoslovakia  .794  .700  -- .760  .706  .803  .835  .956 
Hungary*  -- -- .856  -- -- -- .832  --
Poland*  -- -- .755  -- -- -- .716  --
*Indices reported in Rodrik (1992a). 
Sources:  Facts on Czechoslovak Foreign Trade, 1989 and 1990; Statisticke Prehledy (Monthly Statistics of 
Czechoslovakia), Federal Statistical Office, June  1992, Table 28; FAO Trade Yearbook, 1990; UN, 
ECE, Agricultural Review for Europe, No. 34, Vol. II, Tables XXVI, XXVII. 19 
VI.  Current Trade Policy and Agriculture 
Although a liberal trade policy does not guarantee a rational agricultural policy, the type 
of agricultural policy found in many Western countries does rely on  trade protection.  The 
potential advantages of liberal trade are widely recognized: it allows consumers access to  low 
cost and high quality goods; it encourages efficient allocation of productive resources; it 
disciplines domestic monopolists; it fosters progress by promoting the spread of new 
technology.  To these four benefits, there is the added fifth benefit that a commitment to 
liberal trade makes it impossible to contemplate a Western-style agricultural policy. 
Agriculture will not enjoy the full benefits of an anticipated general liberalization in trade. 
In the case of the Association Agreements with the EC, the special treatment of agriCUlture 
was imposed on CEE from the outside.  Tangennan (1992) estimates the short tenn effect of 
the EC Association Agreements on agricultural trade for EE-3.  He calculates the value to 
these countries of the agreements as the product of the "preference margin" (the difference 
between the MFN levies and the levies under the Association Agreements) and exports to the 
EC of various commodities.  The level of exports is taken as the import quota where this 
exists, and in other cases is the 1990 level of exports.  The calculated value of the 
Agreements, as a percentage of the value of total agricultural exports to the EC in 1990, is in 
the region of 3% - 5%  in  1992. Since the quotas are scheduled to increase over time, this 
value should also increase. By  1996 it reaches 7% for Poland, 14% for Hungary, and 22% for 
CSFR. 
Tangennan notes that these estimates exaggerate the probable benefits to  EE-3 for two 
reasons.  First, the numbers above involve the potential rent resulting from the Agreements, 
but a substantial percentage of that may be captured by the distributors in the EC rather than 
exporters in EE-3.  Second, the calculations are based on  EC support policies prior to the 
announced CAP refonn of May  1992.  That refonn will reduce EC prices, causing the value 
of the preference margin to fall;  this could reduce by more than half the value of preferential 
access.  Thus, it seems unlikely that the Association Agreements will provide a major impetus 
to  CEE agricultural development. 
The Association Agreement shows the strength of protectionism outside CEE.  The 
December 1992 agreement on the Central European Free Trade Area, comprising Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, demonstrates the strength of protectionist 
tendencies within CEE.  The agreement exempts agriculture, allowing the signatories the right 
to protect their domestic agriculture.  Tariffs will be reduced for certain agricultural products, 
but quantitative restrictions and other domestic policies will remain. 
Current CEE agricultural trade policy is described as an attempt to  strike a balance which 
provides the benefits of liberal trade while still protecting domestic producers (Csaki and 
Varga,  1992).  During the beginning of the transition, the EE-3  were remarkable for their 
freedom from trade restraints.  For example, the average import tariff on agricultural and food 
products in Czechoslovakia in  1991  was 5 percent (Czech Ministry of Agriculture, 1992). 20 
Pressure from domestic importers led to the adoption greater protection in  1992.  Table 8 
shows tariff rates for EE-3.  Processors, rather than primary producers, are likely to  be the 
major beneficiaries of this protection. 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have also subsidized agricultural exports. 
Czechoslovakia and Poland subsidized exports of grain and livestock to  FSU in  1991  and 
1992 (Czech Ministry of Agriculture, World Economic Research Institute).  Hungary has 
maintained a long-standing policy of subsidizing exports; nearly 80 percent of the  1993 
. Hungarian agricultural budget is allocated to  measures such as export subsidies (Agra Europe 
1993).  The 80 percent growth of Hungarian agricultural output between  1960 and 1990 was 
largely achieved by  subsidies and state trading which insulated Hungary from world prices. 
Hungarian export subsidies amounted to  12 percent of the value of agricultural exports in 
1991  and are estimated to be  13 percent in  1992 (FAS, USDA and PlanEcon).  Livestock and 
meat products are the most heavily supported, ranging from 20-30 percent of Hungarian 
agriCUltural export receipts in  1992 (USDA, FAS,  1992).  Hungary's agricultural export 
success in the last decade may come to haunt it as  the necessary restructuring to achieve 
competitiveness is postponed in favor of maintaining current export earnings. 
TABLES 
SELECTED CEE AGRICULTURAL IMPORT DUTIES, 1992  (in percent) 
Czechoslovakia  Hungary  Poland 
Live Beef and Pork  25-30  0  35-40 
Meat Products  30  15-20  30 
Butter  30  60  40 
Milk and Cream  30  30  35 
Eggs  n.a.  30  25 
Sugar  60  0  40 
Sources:  Kabat (1993), Tomczak (1992), FASIUSDA. 
The brief period of liberal agricultural trade following reform is in danger of being 
replaced by a protectionist policy typical of developed economies.  The optimal staging of 
reform in general, and the role of trade liberalization in particular, have recently been 
discussed by Dornbusch (1992), Falvey and Kim (1992), and Rodrik (1992b) among others. 21 
Because of the need to raise public finance,6  the opposition by producer groups, and balance 
of payments problems, it is probably not possible to  remove all trade restrictions in the short 
term.  In that case, the consensus is that quantitative restrictions should be replaced by tariffs, 
which should be reduced according to  an  announced and sustainable plan.  The same advice 
is appropriate for the agricultural sector. This does not provide an  argument for an 
"agricultural policy" - any more than does the need to privatize and demonopolize the 
economy.  However, public finance and the balance of payments are sometimes put forward 
as justifications for  agricultural subsidies and tariffs.  For example, despite their admitted 
inefficiency as a method of transfers, these policies are defended on the grounds that direct 
transfers are impractical because of their costs to  the treasury.  The exigencies of public 
finance may justify a general level of trade protection, but they do not provide a basis for 
special protection of a particular sector.  To believe otherwise is to accept the proposition that 
policies for every sector should be self-financing, a position which tolerates the most 
inefficient programs.  Similarly, the idea that a balance of agricultural trade is an intrinsically 
worthwhile policy goal is as quaint as the notion that a balance of chicken trade would serve 
the national interest. 
VII. CEE Agricultural Protectionism as a Response to the West 
What makes agriculture special?  From the standpoint of CEE, one answer is that their 
trading partners in the West heavily subsidize their own agricultural sectors.  Conceivably, 
this provides a reason for an interventionist approach in the CEE.  We consider this issue in 
two parts; first the vague but compelling idea that policies in the West invite a policy 
response from CEE, and then the more focused argument that CEE policies are needed to  set 
the stage for integration into the EC. 
There are no limits to the emotional appeal of subsidies as a means of offsetting 
disadvantages.  For example, socialist agricultural policy in  Czechoslovakia highly subsidized 
those farms with poor soil or poor access to transport.  If  these natural and accidental features 
are considered a legitimate reason for government favour, how much more persuasive is the 
fact that foreign competitors are receiving subsidies.  As a statement about fairness, this can 
only be an argument for income transfers, not for an agricultural policy that promotes 
production.  Two types of beliefs might still rationalize invoking Western subsidies as a 
reason for CEE agriCUltural protection. 
First, it might be thought that CEE policy has some leverage over Western policy, but this 
seems implausible.  Western trade restrictions and agricultural subsidies make it harder to 
sustain economic liberalism (or democracy or the willingness not to migrate) in CEE. 
However, enlightened self interest has proven to be a poor match against sectoral interests in 
6  Poland, the Czech Republic and the  Slovak Republic instituted a V  A  T tax  in early 
1993, weakening the public finance argument for tariffs. 22 
the West.  Only optimists will think that concern for agriculture in  CEE will hasten reform of 
Western agricultural policies. 
Second, it might be believed that agricultural reform will quicken in the West, and that 
CEE agriculture will then be able to compete without subsidies, providing that it has not been 
allowed to decay in  the meantime.  This argument relies on asymmetric information (between 
farmers and policy-makers) or imperfect capital markets.  In either case, it may provide a 
justification of broad support for agriculture given by credit subsidies, but it does not justify 
an  attempt to manage agriculture by means of commodity-specific policies.  The level of 
agriCUltural protection in the West does not make an interventionist policy in  CEE a rational 
response. 
- General trade issues do  not provide grounds for an agricultural policy.  In  the narrower 
area of food aid we might, however, expect reform in the West and also justify an active 
response in CEE.  Food aid serves two purposes for both the donor and the recipient.  The 
first, ostensible purpose, is the same for each:  to  alleviate suffering all:d lessen the risk of 
turmoil.  This aid also has a less benign purpose for each party, to support producers in the 
West, and to discipline them in the East. 
For example, US  Public Law 480 is a "food aid and market development program focused 
on the needs of developing countries and is aimed at establishing a US presence in 
developing markets and supporting economic growth" (USDA 1992, emphasis added).7  The 
objectives of providing aid and promoting market access may be incompatible.  Western aid 
competes with producers in the CEE.  It not only depresses the domestic price, but can also 
destabilize the market.  Western food shipments to Poland are an example of both effects.  In 
autumn of 1989 farmers  stored grain in anticipation of price rises.  In the same year over 80 
per cent of the total value of food aid to Poland was for grain.  Approximately a third of 
grain imports was in the form of aid.  In  1990 food aid was virtually the only source of grain 
imports.  This resulted in a glut and low producer prices in 1991, which led to demands from 
producers for price supports.  When the government is a leading agent in the crisis, it is 
reasonable for producers to expect government help for recovery. 
Food aid and Western export subsidies are  a major factor in agriCUltural trade.  In the 
1992-93 crop year the US  Export Enhancement Program was expected to cover shipment of 
5.5 million tons of wheat to the former Soviet Union (FSU), roughly a fifth of their average 
imports over the past several years.  (The shipments are currently suspended as  a result of 
Russian default of previous food loans.)  The EC credit package of 1.25 billion ECUs will 
finance over two million tons of grain shipments to  the FSU.  Most of this will come from 
EC stocks, although a portion of the money will be used for purchases from Eastern regions 
(USDA  1992).  However, sales to  FSU from EE-3 financed by the EC credit, are deducted 
7  PL480 was established in  1954.  The objectives of supply management and market 
development, and of humanitarian assistance, have been linked for a long time. 23 
from the export quotas EE-3 receives as part of the Association Agreements. Since this policy 
leads to increased CEE exports to FSU and decreased exports to EC, and thereby discourages 
the creation of new marketing channels, it may be harmful to  CEE agriculture in the long run. 
The mixed motives for food aid increases the danger that it has unintended effects.  At 
least for a time Western nations will continue to use export subsidies to capture market share. 
There should be a clear distinction between this motive and the aim of humanitarian 
assistance.  The responsibility for the two should be vested in different agencies.  The 
demonstration that there are insufficient supplies in the recipient country should be a 
requirement for providing humanitarian aid "in kind" rather than in the form of an untied 
grant.  This policy change can only come from the West.  Although it would probably not 
have a large immediate effect, it would be useful as a means of clarifying Western policies, 
both to the public and to politicians. 
CEE governments are implicated in the problem.  Rowinski's (1992b) analysis of the 
instability generated by Western agricultural aid to Poland is revealing. It would be natural to 
justify the decision to request the aid on the grounds that policy-makers were not able to 
predict the effects of the imports.  However, his justification is very different: the state should 
not be subject to the "extortion" of the farmers demanding a high price.  The view that 
holding stocks in anticipation of a price rise is an act of extortion, is shared by many in the 
West, so it is plausible that it is also widely held by CEE policy-makers.  In this case, food 
aid is a means of disciplining producers/storers, as well as a means of feeding the population. 
Storage is an important way of smoothing fluctuations. Ronald Anderson (1992) shows 
that it can make a large contribution to  stability, even in the presence of other stabilizing 
measures, such as international trade.  Government policy that discourages private storage is 
inimical to the development of the agricultural sector. 
In addition to destabilizing domestic agriCUlture, food aid may also be counterproductive if 
it reinforces old power structures. Vadim Ivanov, director of a Moscow economics institute, 
points out that food credits provide support for the bureaucratic structure that controls grain 
imports and distribution.  He claims that "Russia has the potential to avoid all grain imports. 
But the existing system has no desire to undo itself, even when it is no longer needed." 
(Rubinfien, 1993) 
To summarize, we disagree with the notion that Western agricultural subsidies provide a 
rationale for an interventionist policy in CEE.  Western agricultural policies are lamentable 
for a number of reasons, only one of which is their effect on CEE development. Perhaps these 
policies will be reformed.  A clearer understanding (both in the West and East) of the role of 
food aid is a more immediate possibility.  We recognize that there is not a sharp distinction 
between turning down aid on the grounds that it is destabilizing, and imposing a tariff on the 
grounds that the exports are subsidized.  This is a grey area which could be illuminated if 
Western policy were more candid and consistent. CEE import policy must be also be 
consistent (and liberal) so that storage is not discouraged. 24 
We now turn to  the argument recently made by Munk: (1992), that CEE agricultural policy 
is necessary in order to prepare for accession to the EC.
8  The logic is as follows: CEE would 
benefit from joining the EC.  It would be too costly for the EC to  allow CEE into CAP if 
they were to arrive as net agricultural exporters.  Therefore CEE should adopt an agricultural 
policy that aims at an approximate balance of agricultural trade as  a means of paving their 
way into the EC.  We disagree with this argument on a number of grounds. 
First, suppose that CAP continues to protect EC agricultural producers primarily through 
price support programs, as is currently the case.  If  accession means that CEE producers face 
the same prices as producers in other member countries, then in order for accession not to  be 
costly to the EC, it has to  be the case that CEE is  not a net exporter at those prices.  That is, 
it is not enough for the CEE to have a zero balance of agricultural trade; it has to  be the case 
iliat this trade is balanced at the prices that will prevail after accession.  Even if one knew 
what those prices were, there is no reason to believe that their adoption would result in 
balanced trade, since this depends on technology, factor endowments, and consumer tastes. 
Second, suppose as above that the basis for CAP remains price policies, but that now 
accession means CEE faces quotas to  insure that their exports do not flood the (old) EC 
market.  This would be a retrograde policy, since the 1992 Association Agreements 
incorporate a gradual elimination of quotas. In this scenario, CEE is exchanging liberal entry 
(under the Association Agreements) for quotas but higher prices.  There is no reason to 
suppose that CEE negotiators would accept a deal that makes them worse off.  Their 
negotiating position would only be weakened if they already had balanced trade; they would 
effectively have conceded everything before the negotiations. 
Third, and more plausibly, suppose that the projected reforms of CAP get underway so 
that price policies are increasingly replaced by direct income support.  This support could be 
justified as compensation to producers for having accepted the capital loss resulting from the 
diminished price support. There is no reason why it would also be given to  CEE producers 
after accession, since, not having been protected by the original measures, they had not 
suffered the capital loss following their removal.  To the extent that income support does 
replace price support, the costs to CAP and the benefits to CEE producers of accession 
diminish, whatever the agricultural balance of trade;  to  the extent that price supports remain 
the cornerstone of CAP, our arguments above apply. 
Finally, we think: that the idea of designing an  agricultural policy to  somehow track a 
large trading partner assumes an unrealistic level of knowledge about the shape that the 
8  Agra Europe (1993)  No  126, pg 1 writes,  1t ••• Hungary [has]  ... announced plans to set up 
agricultural support systems which bear a striking resemblance to  ... the Common Agricultural 
Policy  .... Budapest has its eyes firmly fixed on  EC membership  .... The Hungarians take the 
view that the closer their poicy resembles that of the Community, the easier it will be to 
adjust to the CAP when membership finally comes.
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partner's policy will take in  the future, and it also assumes an unrealistic ability to  manage 
domestic events.  Aspirations to join the EC do not provide a rationale for a sector-specific 
agricultural policy. 
A final trade-related argument for an agricultural policy is based on the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union and the resulting loss of markets there.  Since liberalization, agricultural 
export subsidies have been used to  maintain sales to  that region.  If these delay production 
and marketing changes needed to re-orient trade, the policies do not serve the long run 
interests of the agricultural sector.  They merely provide an inefficient means of making 
transfers to producers and distributors.  In addition, it is not clear that the agriCUltural  sector 
has been hurt worse than other sectors by the loss of Eastern markets.  As we discussed in 
Section V, CEE economies had already begun to re-direct exports toward the West, even 
l5efore the liberalization of the early 1990s.  Also, the evidence that the composition of CEE 
agricultural exports to the West and to  the former CMEA was more similar than was the case 
for non-agricultural exports suggests that the loss in Soviet markets would result in a more 
severe adjustment problem for manufacturing than for agriCUlture. 
VIII.  CEE Agriculture and Adjustment Assistance 
The adjustment assistance argument for agricultural protection is based on the twin 
presumptions that the sector is declining, and for some reason it is declining too rapidly. 
Among the quasi-fixed factors of agriCUltural production, labour is the most important, for 
both political and economic reasons.9  Therefore, we focus in this section on the adjustment 
of labour.  Experience in the West shows that massive intervention slows the rate of decline 
but does not prevent the agricultural population from shrinking.  If  moderating the speed of 
urban migration is an objective, this might appear to provide a rationale for an agricultural 
policy.  We consider this argument in two stages: first, the issue of whether agriculture is a 
declining sector, and second, the implication of adjustment costs. 
The evidence is consistent with, but does not strongly support, the view that CEE 
agricultural population is likely to decline as a direct result of recent reforms.  A review of 
quantitative models of the effect on agriculture of various policy changes (Karp and Stefanou 
1993b) provides conflicting estimates of changes in aggregate production.  The estimates 
suggest considerable changes in the mix of production, but do not predict an agricultural 
boom.  Since a large part of estimated increases in production is due to  productivity gains, 
9  Workers have the possibility of leaving the agricultural sector, and this usually entails 
adjustment costs.  Many other factors of production in agriculture (e.g., land, machinery,  . 
buildings) are essentially fixed.  The cost of their "adjustment" is irrelevant, since they will 
not be moved. 26 
which includes more efficient use of labour, we interpret these models as  being consistent 
with expectations of a future decline in  the size of the agricultural population. 
We have limited data on actual changes in  the size of the agricultural population 
following liberalization, but East Germany provides an interesting special case.  Paarlberg 
(1992) states that the size of the agricultural population has decreased by more than 80 
percent.  Since this is more than double the unemployment rate, it implies a huge decline in 
the percentage of labour employed in agriCUlture.  However, in East Germany, as in other 
CEE countries, many workers employed on state farms and collectives were actually involved 
in manufacturing or service enterprises rather than agriCUlture.  Following liberalization there 
has  been a move to  separate these activities from farming, leading to a reclassification of 
workers.  Consequently, it is hard to interpret the official data.  In addition, there were several 
aspects of East German liberalization not shared by other CEE countries, which make the fall 
in the agricultural population particularly severe there.  First, unification resulted in an 
overvalued exchange rate, which discouraged the production of tradeables; second, entry into 
the CAP required accepting quotas on the production of certain commodities, which also 
contributed to a fall in the demand for agricultural labour; third, the possibility of migration 
to the West increased the opportunity cost of remaining in agriculture.  Despite these 
qualifications, the East German experience is at least consistent with the view that the 
agricultural population will decline. 
Another perspective is obtained by looking at the relation between the pre-reform share of 
agriCUltural workers and estimates of per capita GNP in CEE, and comparing these to 
corresponding numbers in market economies.  Data on 64 countries, excluding CEE, were 
obtained from World Bank (1992).  A group of 41  low-middle income countries with an 
average per capita GNP (in  1990 dollars) of $4300 had an average of 35 percent of their 
labour forces in agriculture; the corresponding numbers for 23  high income countries are 
$15,500 and 5 percent.  For the sample as a whole, the numbers were $8,300 and 24 percent. 
We ran various regressions relating income to  agricultural labour share.  In all cases the 
relationship is significant and negative, and explained 30 - 70 percent of the variation in 
agricultural labour share.  The agricultural labour share in  1988 for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
and Poland were approximately  10 percent, 13 percent, and 22 percent, respectively (Table 
1).  Wang and Winters (1992) summarize various estimates of per capita GNP for the three 
countries in  1988.  The PlanEcon and CIA estimates suggest a plausible range of $7600 -
$10,000 for Czechoslovakia, $6500 - $8600 for Hungary, and $5400 - $7200 for Poland. 
Using this GNP data and the various regression results described above,  we obtain estimates 
of what the share of labour in  agriculture would have been, had the CEE countries been 
market economies with the same per capita GNP levels.
10 
10  These calculations ignore other determinants of agricultural labour share, such as land 
per capita.  However, we expect that the inclusion of such variables would have strengthened 
the conclusion. On the basis of factor endowments, CEPR (1990) and Kym Anderson (1992) 
conclude that CEE is likely to  have a comparative advantage in agriculture. To  the extent that 27 
Comparison of these estimates with the actual labour shares suggests that the pre-refonn 
economic systems did not lead to systematically larger shares of labour in agriculture. This 
implies that there is no  reason to expect refonn to lead directly to a smaller agricultural 
population. Socialist policies were designed to encourage a high degree of agricultural self-
sufficiency and the policies promoted inefficient use of labour.  Both of these considerations 
would lead us to expect those policies to result in an inordinately large share of labour in 
agriCUlture.  However, labour was used inefficiently throughout the state controlled sectors, 
where other activities were promoted without regard to comparative advantage. 
If  refonn leads to  an  increase in per capita GNP, the regression results suggest that the 
agriCUltural labour share will fall.  For example, under Rollo and Stem's (1992) "optimistic 
scenario", per capita GNP in Poland in the year 2000 is nearly 25 percent higher than in 
1988.  An elasticity of agri~ultura1labour share, with respect to per capita GNP, of -1  is 
within the range of estimates we obtained in the regressions described above.  These 
estimates of increase in GNP and elasticity imply that the agricultural labour share in Poland 
falls from 22 percent to  i'7 percent  Over 1985 - 1990 the labour share fell from 24 percent 
to 22 percent (fable 1).  Under Rollo and Stem's "pessimistic scenario", GNP per capita falls 
in Poland between 1988 and 2000; in that case, no decrease in the agricultural labour share is 
expected. 
Based on the limited evidence described above, it is at least plausible that the share of the 
eEE labour force in agriculture will fall.  This is more likely the more successful the refonns 
are in increasing income and labour efficiency.  Thus, there is a case to be made that 
agriculture is likely to  be a shrinking sector.  Whether this implies a role for agricultural 
policy depends on the nature of adjustment costs, the issue we now address. 
Factors of production, especially labour, move following a change in the terms of trade of 
the magnitude experienced by CEE agriculture.  The varied reasons why the sector does not 
immediately reach the new long run equilibrium are often lumped together and described as 
adjustment costs.  The cost of the last worker leaving a sector over a given period of time 
increases with the number of workers leaving the sector during that period.  The optimal 
speed of adjustment balances the increase in cost with the benefit of having the worker in the 
more productive sector.  The presumption that the agricultural sector will contract, and that 
this will generate adjustment costs, suggests a possible role for agriCUltural policy. For 
example, it is sometimes argued that refonn should proceed slowly, since the immediate 
removal of trade restrictions or subsidies causes a sudden deterioration in sector tenns of 
trade and encourages too rapid adjustment, and excessive adjustment costs. 
The presence of adjustment costs provides a weak rationale for a sectoral policy. First, 
there is nothing intrinsic about these costs that implies market failure and a role for 
production is determined by comparative advantage under a liberal trade regime, the CEE 
agricultural population would be larger than the level predicted on the basis of only income. 28 
government intervention. A policy response is appropriate only if the adjustment costs are 
associated with some kind of market failure, and then the policy should target the market 
failure rather than the costs.  (See Falvey and Kim for a more detailed discussion of this 
point.)  Two plausible kinds of market failure illustrate this: fIrst,  individuals may have poorer 
information or may understand the dynamic process less well than policy-makers, and second, 
they may face credit constraints due to  imperfect capital markets.  The initial effect of a 
deterioration in the terms of trade causes farmers to leave the sector; as they leave, the value 
of the marginal product of the remaining farmers increases, since there will be fewer farmers 
on the land and less domestic production.  The decision to  leave should take into account the 
stream of future earnings, and not merely current earnings.  Farmers who do not do this, 
either because of the quality of their information or their inability to obtain financing for the 
crisis, may leave the sector when under ideal circumstances they should remain.  The 
appropriate policies in the first case is  to provide farmers with better estimates of future 
prices, and in the second case to make it easier for them to obtain credit. 
In the examples above, the adjustment costs were born by the individual who makes the 
decision, and the market failure meant that he was unable to  account properly for the future. 
Another type of market failure implies that the individual bears only part of the social cost, 
and that therefore adjustment is too rapid relative to  the social optimum.  In  this case, the 
principal of targeting implies that the private cost should be increased, perhaps by an implicit 
tax on migration. 
Since such a tax would not be politically acceptable, the argument leads proponents of 
sectoral policies to recommend these as a second best option.  It is possible to support almost 
any policy recommendation on the basis of some second best argument. Theoretical models of 
adjustment costs with market imperfections and a restricted policy menu (Karp and Paul, 
1993) illustrate that the optimal policy is very sensitive to the nature of these costs.  In  some 
of these models, the policy trajectory looks nothing like that proposed by those who want to 
defend sectoral interests. These theoretical considerations make adjustment costs an 
unconvincing grounds for a sectoral policy. 
Recent practical experience reinforces this skepticism. Again, the example of East 
Germany is interesting. After reviewing the adjustment assistance that has been given the 
agricultural sector, Paarlberg (1992) concludes that an excessive portion of this has gone to 
easing the costs of adjustment (e.g.  unemployment benefits) rather than to promoting new 
investment.  Begg and Portes (1992) reach the same conclusion regarding adjustment 
assistance for nonagricultural sectors.  Many Western countries also have adjustment 
assistance programs.  The high opportunity cost of government revenue means that these 
programs are not an  attractive policy option in  CEE.  Even when adjustment assistance is 
self-fInancing, as with tariffs, the disadvantages of them outweigh the benefits. 29 
IX. Conclusion 
The legacy of socialism and the example of Western nations creates pressure in CEE to 
adopt a network of policies that aim at managing their agricultural sectors.  In our view this 
would be a mistake. We acknowledge a critical role for government in the economy. This role 
includes encouraging the development of institutions such as banking and stock markets. 
managing the process of privatization. regulating monopolists. and assisting the poor.  It may 
also involve such illiberal but expedient measures as tariffs.  This does not require pursuing 
an agricultural policy. a road which is paved with good intentions. 
Most of the problems in agriculture are also faced by other sectors.  In the interests of 
avoiding the proliferation of special interest groups. remedies should be designed at the 
national rather than the sect.9ral level.  The advantages of the resulting decrease in 
government flexibility outweigh the disadvantages.  Agricultural ministries should not 
determine agricultural policy.  To the extent that special aid is available for the agriCUltural 
sector. as distinct from the general aid to the unemployed. this should be mediated through 
the banks.  This method encourages the growth of these banks. -keeps government 
involvement at arms length. leads to less distortion of production and investment decisions. 
and will be easier to phase out, compared to price policies.  Western agricultural policy 
makes it harder for CEE to follow this advice. but does not alter the economic reasons for 
doing so. 30 
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